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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AN: D80041f-0322

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ACTION SS-30 KABUL 02445 281320Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
-----071845 281448Z /445

P R 281014Z AUG 80  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8039  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *Lip Kelley* DATE *8/14/89*

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY in PART  
( ) EXCISE ( ) Non-responsive info.  
FOR HQ or PA exemptions

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TS authority to:  
( ) CLASSIFY as  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/28/00 (GRIFFIN, GEORGE G. B.) OR-M  
TAGS: PINR PEPR AF UR  
SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S AFGHAN STRATEGY

REF: (A) MOSCOW 14664, (B) INR REPORT NO. 1417 DTD JULY 18 (NODIS)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE EXCELLENT REFERENCED REPORTS POINT TO A TREND IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WHICH SUGGEST LONGER-RANGE INTENTIONS. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTENTIONALLY POSTPONING A BUILDUP OF THEIR FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN TO BUTTRESS THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THEIR DIFFICULTIES ARE ENTIRELY DUE TO "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE" BY THE U.S. AND OTHER "IMPERIALISTS" THROUGH AND WITH THE (PRIMARY) ASSISTANCE OF PAKISTAN.

3. THE INR REPORT NOTES ON PAGE 5 THAT IN EFFECT MOSCOW IS ESTABLISHING A PAINFUL LEVEL OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY AS A BASIC ELEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND INSISTING THAT THE INSURGENCY END BEFORE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES. I AGREE, BUT WOULD ADD THAT BY AVOIDING THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE TROOPS, BY ADMITTING THAT SOVIET FORCES ARE UNDER ATTACK  
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ON MOSCOW TELEVISION, AND BY REVEALING IN SOVIET AND AFGHAN

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MEDIA THAT "BANDITS" ARE ACTIVE THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO REINFORCE THEIR CONTENTION THAT THEY ARE BEING "FORCED" TO RETAIN THEIR "LIMITED CONTINGENT" HERE UNTIL THE RESISTANCE ENDS.

4. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO BE CONSTRUCTING A BETTER JUSTIFICATION FOR A FUTURE ATTACK ON PAKISTAN, AND PERHAPS IRAN IF SUBVERSION AND CROSS-BORDER THRUSTS DO NOT PRODUCE THE RESULTS THEY WANT. ISLAMABAD HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED ATTENTION TO PERCEIVED SOVIET THREATS AGAINST PAKISTAN, AND THE DISPARATE ELEMENTS THAT ARE TRYING TO RULE IRAN HAVE MADE SIMILAR NOISES. WE HAVE DETECTED APPARENT SOVIET-BACKED SUBVERSION IN BOTH COUNTRIES, AND SPORADIC SOVIET AND AFGHAN OVERFLIGHTS OF PAKISTAN. THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE ISLAMABAD INTO DOCILITY WITHOUT PROVOKING US TO INTERVENE ON PAKISTAN'S BEHALF IS EVIDENT. FROM HERE, IT ALSO LOOKS AS IF SOVIET LEADERS ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT WE WILL ATTACK IRAN TO EITHER RESCUE THE HOSTAGES OR LAY CLAIM TO THE OIL FIELDS, OR BOTH.

5. PERSONALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT A SOVIET PERCEPTION THAT WE MIGHT INVADE IRAN WAS ALWAYS A MAJOR RATIONALE FOR THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE EVIDENCE IS MOUNTING THAT THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED AND DISMAYED TO DISCOVER THAT THEY WERE NOT ONLY NOT WELCOMED HERE, BUT WORSE, ACTIVELY RESISTED. INSTEAD OF HAVING THE LUXURY OF MOVING QUIETLY INTO BASES IN A FRIENDLY COUNTRY FROM WHICH THEY COULD "PROTECT" THEIR PERCEIVED INTERESTS IN THE REGION, THEY ARE BEING FORCED TO FIRST CLEAR THE AREA AND PROVIDE SECURITY AGAINST AN UNEXPECTED ENEMY -- THE AFGHAN PATRIOT.

6. IT MAY TAKE YEARS FOR THE SOVIETS TO TAKE THE NEXT STEPS  
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IN THEIR "DEFENSIVE" PLAN, OR THEY MAY BE PROMPTED TO MOVE RAPIDLY BY A PERCEIVED THREAT TO THEIR NEW FOOTHOLD. THEIR PROBES AGAINST PAKISTAN IN PARTICULAR SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY HAVE SPEEDED UP THEIR TIMETABLE. (THE ATTACKS ON THE ZIA GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO APPEARED IN THE DRA MEDIA.) THEIR RHETORIC INDICATES THAT THEY FEEL BESEIGED AND WORRIED THAT IF THEY DO NOT MOVE FIRST, WE WILL. THEY OF COURSE BLITHELY IGNORE THE FACT THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HELPED TO CREATE THAT THREAT.

7. THE SOVIET VIEW OF IRAN IS PROBABLY PRETTY MUCH THE

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SAME AS OURS -- A BRIARPATCH INTO WHICH THEY WOULD RATHER NOT STEP. THAT, AND THE CONSTANT REPETITION OF THE THEME THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE "EXTERNAL THREAT" AGAINST THE DRA COMES FROM PAKISTAN SUGGESTS THAT IT IS IN THAT DIRECTION THAT THEY WILL MAKE THEIR FIRST OVERT MOVES, EVEN THOUGH THEIR MORE IMPORTANT INTERESTS LIE FURTHER TO THE WEST. THE WILLINGNESS OF SEVERAL LEADING PAKISTANIS TO ADVOCATE CLOSER TIES TO THE USSR TO FORESTALL A PHYSICAL ATTACK, AND THE VOCIFEROUS ANTI-PATHY OF THE AVERAGE IRANIAN TO THE SOVIETS, RE-INFORCE THAT VIEW. GRIFFIN.

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EXDIS REVIEW

- Cat. A - Caption removed;  
transferred to O/FADRC  
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC  
with additional access  
controlled by S/S  
Cat. C - Caption and custody  
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Enish Kelly Jr.

Date: 8/21/89 19\_\_

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